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	<title>Mobile Foresight &#187; Mobile Industry</title>
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	<link>http://www.mobileforesight.com</link>
	<description>Jonas Lind’s blog about innovations, business models, trends, and other things that propel the telecom/media sector forward</description>
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		<title>What will happen to webOS after HP’s exit?</title>
		<link>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/08/what-will-happen-to-webos-after-hp-exit/</link>
		<comments>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/08/what-will-happen-to-webos-after-hp-exit/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Aug 2011 12:21:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jonas Lind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobile Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[webOS]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mobileforesight.com/?p=1574</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: center;">Update: According to The Next Web’s internal sources, HP is NOT going to
sell or shut webOS down, just the underperforming hardware device division.
HP communicated this in a clumsy way which gave the erroneous impression
that webOS was dead or for sale. HP’s plan seems to be to license webOS to hardware partners. But if [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: center;"><em><b>Update:</b> According to <a href="http://thenextweb.com/insider/2011/08/19/an-inside-look-at-hp-killing-webos-hardware-here%E2%80%99s-how-it-really-went-down/">The Next Web’s </a>internal sources, HP is NOT going to<br />
sell or shut webOS down, just the underperforming hardware device division.<br />
HP communicated this in a clumsy way which gave the erroneous impression<br />
that webOS was dead or for sale. HP’s plan seems to be to license webOS to hardware partners. But if HP is going to sell their PC division, they can’t force<br />
the buyer to promote webOS on the desktop platform. WebOS as a<br />
competitor to Windows 8 still seems quite unlikely. </em></p>
<p>&nbsp; </p>
<p>My previous <a href="/?p=1558">blog</a> post about the potential for HP/webOS to expand webOS into the desktop and compete with Windows 8 was only two days old when HP announced their plans to abandon the tablet/smartphone market and their commitment to webOS. I got it wrong. This has been an interesting week in a frantically fast moving industry. Friday is not over so there is still time for another major announcement. How about Microsoft buying Nokia or Dell buying RIM?</p>
<p>I think HP made a rushed and unwise decision. Their Palm smartphones and HP Touchpad tablet didn’t sell, but that was due to clumsy design, weak hardware, and bugs. It was not caused by some inherent weakness in webOS.</p>
<p>If they had persevered, promoted an ecosystem, and licensed webOS I think they would have had a chance on the market. After the Google/Moto deal several of the Android licensees (LG, HTC, Sony Ericsson, Samsung, etc.) would probably have been interested in an alternative OS to reduce their dependence of Google.</p>
<p>And as I said in my previous blog post, if and when the HTML5/cloud paradigm becomes dominant, most existing HTML5 web apps will automatically become part of a huge virtual webOS app store inventory.</p>
<p>I haven’t really had time to consider potential webOS buyers. Here are some rough ideas: If HP includes the patent portfolio in the deal they can probably get a better price. Google and Samsung might be interested for hoarding more patents. Other usual suspects would be LG, HTC, Sony Ericsson, ZTE and Huawei. Or possibly China Mobile, Verizon or another large operator. Amazon might be interested in using webOS for a tablet/cloud service offer. Dell, Lenovo, Acer or Asus might want to develop cloud-PC solutions  based on webOS to escape Windows 8 and Microsoft’s stranglehold. Perhaps next week’s events and mega deals will provide some answers.</p>
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		<title>WebOS’s new life as HP’s Trojan horse</title>
		<link>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/08/webos-new-life-as-hp-trojan-horse/</link>
		<comments>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/08/webos-new-life-as-hp-trojan-horse/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Aug 2011 09:18:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jonas Lind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobile Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HTML5]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[microsoft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[webOS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Windows 8]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mobileforesight.com/?p=1558</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p class="wp-caption-text">webOS from HP/Palm on different screens</p>
<p>The Google/Motorola deal suddenly makes it relevant to take a closer look at the other OS platforms on the market. Most industry observers in the mobile space have already written off HP/Palm’s webOS as a dead platform. From a smartphone perspective, this is obvious at first sight. With two [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_1566" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 510px"><a href="http://www.mobileforesight.com/sv/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/webOS-HP-press-kit.png"><img src="http://www.mobileforesight.com/sv/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/webOS-HP-press-kit.png" alt="" title="webOS HP press kit" width="500" height="500" class="size-full wp-image-1566" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">webOS from HP/Palm on different screens</p></div>
<p>The Google/Motorola deal suddenly makes it relevant to take a closer look at the other OS platforms on the market. Most industry observers in the mobile space have already written off HP/Palm’s webOS as a dead platform. From a smartphone perspective, this is obvious at first sight. With two percent of smartphone users in their only market (<a href="http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/?p=28516">US</a>), <a href="http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1764714">negligible</a> global sales, and a thin app store, they don’t have much going for them. HP recently released a tablet powered by webOS but according to the <a href="http://www.engadget.com/2011/06/29/hp-touchpad-review/">reviewers</a> the <a href="http://www.anandtech.com/show/4508/hp-touchpad-review/1">product</a> is clumsy and behind the competition. There is talk about Samsung <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-29/hewlett-packard-is-in-talks-to-license-webos-software-ceo-apotheker-says.html">licensing</a> webOS for a few handsets but no products have hit the shelves yet.</p>
<p>HP/webOS can not currently compete head to head with Apple and Android, even though the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebOS">webOS</a> technical platform is excellent. The platform is designed for true multitasking and for running web apps based on HTML5/JavaScript/CCS with hardware accelerated execution.</p>
<p>But there are a couple of scenarios where webOS can be viable. For example, if HTML5 becomes dominant and native apps fade into oblivion. In that case, the advantage of the market leaders’ huge app stores will become irrelevant and webOS will be able to compete on a level playing field. As webOS is optimized for HTML5 from the beginning, there is a good chance that apps will work better than on the competing platforms. If other OEMs become wary of using Android after Google’s Motorola purchase, webOS might be more attractive for licensing. An additional factor that could reinforce this scenario is the rise of cloud computing. If all this plays out, handset OEMs and mobile operators might consider webOS as a way of reducing the market power of Android, Microsoft, and Apple. But even if native apps are sidelined by HTML5, the smartphone market leaders will still have a huge advantage due to their brand, size, and market share.</p>
<p>However, if the game plan changes, webOS could reappear as a serious contender. If and when the cloud becomes the dominant computing paradigm, webOS will be a good fit for a range of devices. The drawback is that the mobile connection to the smartphone will always be unreliable and rather slow. If all your documents, contacts, messaging and apps are stored in the cloud this will be a problem. Enter the PC (and to some extent the tablet). For the PC one usually has a reliable broadband connection. That is where cloud computing (and hence webOS) would work best. And this is the direction HP is moving in with webOS.<a href="http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/hp-planning-to-put-webos-on-every-pc-it-ships-in-2012/"> HP will install webOS</a> on all their products (PCs, tablets, printers etc.) from 2012.</p>
<p>Industry observers predict that HP wants webOS so it can provide users with “experience roaming” across all devices, where webOS will ensure that users can keep their profile and contacts. The <a href="http://blogs.forrester.com/frank_gillett/11-02-09-  hp_synergy_not_webos_is_what_will_differentiate_hp">Synergy</a> feature in webOS aggregates all the user’s contacts and supports that strategy. <a href="http://www.engadget.com/2011/02/09/webos-enyo-framework-free-to-developers-today-brings-pixel-dens/">Enyo</a> is webOS’s development framework and supports handling different screen sizes in a seamless way. This is probably part of HP’s plan.</p>
<p>But HP’s bolder move is to install webOS together with the upcoming Windows 8 on the traditional PC. I don’t know if this was part of HP’s original strategy when they bought Palm in April 2010 or added by the new CEO Léo Apotheker who joined HP in September 2010. If webOS boots faster than Windows 8, if HP gives the user a choice between webOS and Windows during boot, and if the user primarily uses the PC to access HTML5 web apps in the cloud – then perhaps users will choose to boot webOS instead of Windows and gradually stop using the legacy Windows platform. This would give HP huge leverage in future price negotiations with Microsoft. WebOS will be HP’s Trojan horse for breaking into Microsoft’s territory on the PC.</p>
<p>Windows 8 is a radical departure from the traditional desktop keyboard and mouse paradigm. <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UYSSdSNFjhU">Windows 8</a> comes with full touch screen support and their UI theme (“Metro”) has a look and feel with tiles that plagiarizes WP7 and most of the smartphone/tablets platforms. The traditional legacy desktop environment is hidden inside tiles. Windows 8 is built for app development in – surprise surprise – HTML5. The same as webOS. If we disregard the support for legacy desktop apps, Windows 8 and webOS will almost be head to head competitors. And while webOS is optimized for web apps, Windows 8 has to carry a huge legacy baggage to keep backward compatibility.</p>
<p>Will one of the most insignificant smartphone platforms rise from the ashes and conquer the giant of the PC era? Don’t rule it out just yet.</p>
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		<title>How cross-platform tools can end the OS wars</title>
		<link>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/07/how-cross-platform-tools-can-end-the-os-wars/</link>
		<comments>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/07/how-cross-platform-tools-can-end-the-os-wars/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Jul 2011 10:09:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jonas Lind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobile Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[90/10 coding]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[90/10 porting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[android]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Appcelerator]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[appMobi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corona SDK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cross-platform]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cross-platform market]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cross-platform tools]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HTML5]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hybrid apps]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[iOS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Java]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Java ME]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kony]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marmalade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MoSync]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[native apps]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OpenPlug]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PhoneGap]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Qt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rhodes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sencha Touch]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[smartphone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[WorkLight]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mobileforesight.com/?p=1496</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">This article has previously been published on VisionMobile&#8217;s blog.</p>
<p>&#160; 
The Android vs. iOS vs. Windows Phone platform battle has been the talk of the industry for the last year. But the market share battle between handset platforms might not be as critical for the industry as many believe.</p>
<p>A popular view in the industry [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.mobileforesight.com/sv/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Xplatform-OSWars.png"><img src="http://www.mobileforesight.com/sv/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Xplatform-OSWars.png" alt="" title="Xplatform OSWars" width="500" height="438" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-1517" /></a></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><em>This article has previously been published on <a href="http://www.visionmobile.com/blog/2011/06/platform-x-how-cross-platform-tools-can-end-the-os-wars/">VisionMobile&#8217;s</a> blog.</em></p>
<p>&nbsp; <br />
The Android vs. iOS vs. Windows Phone platform battle has been the talk of the industry for the last year. But the market share battle between handset platforms might not be as critical for the industry as many believe.</p>
<p>A popular view in the industry is that the market is inevitably moving towards an Apple-Google duopoly. Apple’s app store has more than 400,000 apps. Android is growing quickly from a base of more than 250,000 apps and is predicted to catch up with Apple later this year. Nearly 80 percent of all apps in app stores are controlled by these two market giants according to <a href="http://www.distimo.com/blog/2011_04_the-battle-for-the-most-content-and-the-emerging-tablet-market/">Distimo</a>. Figures for Q1 2011 from <a href="http://www.pcworld.com/article/228218/gartner_android_dominates_smartphone_sales_worldwide.html">Gartner</a> show that the market share in the smartphone market for iOS and Android combined is 53 percent and rising.</p>
<p>But the duopoly may be challenged by the mobile web and cross-platform tools. HTML5 empowers all other platforms to offer apps through the browser. VisionMobile’s recent <a href="http://www.visionmobile.com/devecon.php">Developer Economics</a> report shows that the mobile web (of which HTML5 is a subset) is already the third most popular platform in terms of developer mindshare after Android and iOS.</p>
<p>At the same time, HTML5 is overhyped and the belief that HTML5 will replace almost all native apps is in need of a <a href="/?p=1396">reality check</a>. Native apps will still offer richer functionality, better performance, and higher security compared to HTML5-based apps. A study by quirksmode.org has shown that every mobile <a href="http://quirksmode.org/webkit.html">WebKit</a> implementation is slightly different, which could cause a problem for HTML5-based apps. In a recent whitepaper, Netbiscuits measured <a href="http://www.netbiscuits.com/mobile-metrics-report-2011">smartphone support for 18 features in HTML5</a> and showed that leading smartphones only offer partial (or no) support for a significant number of these features. Implementation is also fragmented. What works on iPhone will probably not work on RIM or Samsung handsets and vice versa. Or to quote Forrester’s take on the <a href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/mobile/2011/01/2011-mobile-trends-a-look-ahead.php">HTML5 vs. native</a> debate: “The ‘Apps vs. Internet’ Debate Will Continue…to be irrelevant.”, “it’s not a question of ‘either/or’ when it comes to a choice between apps vs. the mobile Web, but both.”</p>
<h5>The Landscape Of Cross-Platform Development Tools</h5>
<p>The new types of cross-platform tools are more interesting than plain HTML5 because they can deliver higher performance and functionality than browser based HTML5. These tools produce apps as output and fall roughly into two categories:</p>
<p>1) Web apps/hybrid apps. These apps exploit the web engine (“web browser”) and are typically written in HTML/CSS/JavaScript.</p>
<p>2) Native apps. These apps are compiled into machine code and often written in C++ or similar languages.</p>
<p>Cross-platform tools are a nascent market with a flurry of startup activity over the last few years. The following diagram illustrates different trade-offs between complexity and performance in the cross-platform tools market.</p>
<div id="attachment_1499" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 710px"><a href="http://www.mobileforesight.com/sv/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/X-platf-tools-JLind.jpg"><img class="size-full wp-image-1499" title="X-platf-tools JLind" src="http://www.mobileforesight.com/sv/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/X-platf-tools-JLind.jpg" alt="" width="700" height="571" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Market segments for mobile cross-platform tools</p></div>
<p><strong>Traditional websites</strong>: In the lower left corner is the traditional website, limited in performance but providing access to all platforms with no added complexity. Plain HTML5 could be included here once all browsers support the standard.</p>
<p><strong>Web apps/hybrid apps</strong>: Adjacent in the diagram are HTML5 web apps that can be downloaded to the browser’s cache and run offline. They will offer better performance and only slightly higher complexity. One step up in the diagram is a market segment of cross-platform tools running simulated native. These tools deliver better performance but the complexity is also higher if the tool has to support multiple platforms. Here we find tools that produce web apps built on HTML5/CCS3 and JavaScript, with some added native elements, typically inside a native wrapper. These cross-platform tools often add native extensions that provide access to some low level native functionality. An example of a player in this market segment is <a href="http://www.phonegap.com/">PhoneGap</a>, which is often used in tandem with the <a href="http://www.sencha.com/products/touch/">Sencha Touch</a> framework. Other tools that run on top of PhoneGap are <a href="http://www.worklight.com/">WorkLight</a> and <a href="http://www.appmobi.com/">appMobi</a>.</p>
<p>A closely related market segment is hybrid tools, where the HTML5/JavaScript input is translated into actual native source code. An example of a hybrid tool vendor is <a href="http://www.appcelerator.com/">Appcelerator’s</a> Titanium.</p>
<p>Other types of solutions which fall under the main heading of web/hybrid apps are based on Java, Lua, ActionScript or less common languages. The diagram shows how the heavily-fragmented Java ME offers inferior performance in spite of high complexity. The cross-platform tools <a href="http://www.anscamobile.com/corona/">Corona SDK</a> and <a href="http://dragonrad.com/">DragonRAD</a> are based on Lua. <a href="http://rhomobile.com/">Rhodes</a> is based on HTML/Ruby while <a href="http://www.openplug.com/">OpenPlug</a> uses ActionScript (Flash) as source language. <a href="http://www.kony.com/">Kony</a> uses drag-n-drop for building enterprise web apps. There is no reliable information about the performance/complexity trade-off for most of these solutions, so their exact position in the diagram above should be viewed as illustrative. In general, tools in which the resulting code is compiled or recompiled to native ARM machine code will have a higher performance.</p>
<p><strong>Native apps</strong>: The second main category is native apps. In cross-platform tools for native apps, developers often work with a codebase in C/C++ or C# which is then semi-automatically ported to the target platform and device. Performance is significantly higher with native code, but so is the complexity. Players in this sector include Airplay, Qt and MoSync. The <a href="http://airplaysdk.com/">Airplay SDK</a> (now Marmalade) originates in 3D gaming but can also be used as a general C++ cross-platform tool. <a href="http://qt.nokia.com/">Qt</a> is a cross-platform UI framework that also can be used for native C++ porting. Qt primarily supports Nokia’s legacy platforms. <a href="http://www.mosync.com/">MoSync</a> is a cross-platform tool for general purpose C++ development, integrated with the Eclipse IDE and also available under an open source (GPL) license.</p>
<h5>Cross-Platform Beyond Java – Native Extensions</h5>
<p>The traditional approach to cross-platform development has been a lowest common denominator one – much like that taken by Java, Flash Lite and mobile HTML. This approach sacrifices performance, UI pizzazz and access to specific device features.</p>
<p>A workaround is to add native extensions. These can provide additional SDK/NDK libraries for the IDE and also give access to low level hardware functionality. Access to low-level hardware functionality can be managed by a device database that controls which conditional code will be executed on a given device.</p>
<p>Several of the cross-platform vendors have built such device databases with various levels of detail. A device database contains information on screen size, input modality and exact OS version, extending to detailed hardware configurations and known bugs with workarounds.</p>
<p>Using native extensions, it is possible to overcome the inherent limitations that plagued Java. Instead of “write once, run everywhere”, developers can spend 90 percent of their time developing a common codebase and 10 percent adding native tweaks and extensions for each platform and device. For software purists, the 90/10 solution might not seem very elegant, but it is a way forward that can handle the incredible complexity with thousands of devices running more than five OS platforms. In this way, app developers can manage one codebase and port it to target devices without losing functionality. In principle, using a (C++) cross-platform engine with extensions should be able to offer similar functionality with minimal performance penalty as compared to direct development for the target device. There will be significant economies of scale when the common codebase is tweaked for 100s of devices.</p>
<h5>The Disruptive Potential Of Cross-Platform</h5>
<p>There are few signs that platform fragmentation will disappear. It’s not just Android, iOS and Windows Phone 7, which are backed by corporate giants with deep pockets, but also smaller players like QNX (RIM), WebOS (HP), MeeGo (Intel, China Mobile) and Bada (Samsung). Add to that legacy platforms, which will be around for at least a few years: Windows Mobile, Blackberry OS, Symbian, BREW, Java ME and Flash. If we also include the main desktop platforms (Windows, Mac OS, Ubuntu), gaming consoles, set-top boxes, cars, and other gadgets, the number of platforms becomes unmanageable.</p>
<p>App developers whose clients need to reach the entire market, face the formidable task of supporting all platforms and devices. If they can use a cross-platform engine the productivity gains will be dramatic compared to paying for separate in-house dev teams for each platform.</p>
<p>Early adopters of cross-platform will most likely be large consumer businesses who need to target the mass market such as media companies, games houses, entertainment companies, banks, and any brand developing B2C apps. Similarly, government agencies are often required to provide non-discriminatory access to their services and cross-platform tools will enable them to do just that. Another group of early adopters of cross-platform tools is CIOs of larger corporations. They face increasing demand from senior staff who want to use their favorite smartphone for secure access of internal company data. Once these early adopters have driven down the prices and sorted out stability issues we should expect to see a fast uptake of cross-platform tools in the mainstream app development market.</p>
<p>Assuming more developers move to cross-platform tools, the power distribution in the mobile sector will be challenged. The difference in the number of available apps between dominant and up-n-coming platforms will be reduced. This will allow smaller platforms to compete on a level playing field.</p>
<p>Web apps and HTML5 should make the largest dent in the market power of traditional platforms. But the final nail in the coffin will come when C++ cross-platform engines can offer almost the same performance and functionality as coding directly on the target platform. This is possible if the cross-platform engines can fully integrate native platform and device extensions. In that case, developers of native apps might reconsider Android, iOS and WP7 and choose to code to a cross-platform IDE, not to the platform. In this scenario, the cross-platform IDEs would become players of equal or even greater importance than the native platforms. At the very least, today’s OS platform wars will move to a totally different level.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><em>Comments can be left at VisionMobile&#8217;s <a href="http://www.visionmobile.com/blog/2011/06/platform-x-how-cross-platform-tools-can-end-the-os-wars/">blog</a>.</em></p>
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		<title>Exorbitant data roaming as an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma</title>
		<link>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/06/exorbitant-data-roaming-prisoners-dilemma/</link>
		<comments>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/06/exorbitant-data-roaming-prisoners-dilemma/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Jun 2011 21:50:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jonas Lind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobile Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Telecom 2.0]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[game theory]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mobile data]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prisoner's Dilemma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[roaming]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mobileforesight.com/?p=1463</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>One of the major hurdles for further growth of mobile data services, and LBS in particular, is the exorbitant data traffic fees customers incur when using their phones abroad.</p>
<p>Corporate users can pretend that the service is free but their employers certainly notice if the mobile Net bill is larger than the hotel bill. In the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One of the major hurdles for further growth of mobile data services, and LBS in particular, is the exorbitant data traffic fees customers incur when using their phones abroad.</p>
<p>Corporate users can pretend that the service is free but their employers certainly notice if the mobile Net bill is larger than the hotel bill. In the private market segment, price sensitivity is much higher. Prices have to come down for this market to reach its potential.</p>
<p>As long as the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_elasticity_of_demand">price elasticity</a> of demand is larger than one, lower traffic fees will lead to such high growth in traffic volume that the total revenue increases, despite the lower prices. The entire industry would benefit from an agreement to remove most of the roaming charges, but that is not even on the horizon.</p>
<p>A single operator could see the benefits of offering affordable data traffic abroad for its own customers. But as long as other operators don’t reciprocate, the industry will be stuck in a sub-optimal stalemate.</p>
<p>The problem is that the same operator who wants to offer an affordable rate to its own customers has no incentive to lower prices for other operator’s customers who travel into the operator’s coverage area.</p>
<p>It would not help much if two operators were to reach a bilateral agreement about lower roaming fees. In most countries there are three or more operators and as long as the handset connects to the strongest signal a bilateral agreement would just create a random patchwork of affordable and exorbitant fees. It would still be confusing, add uncertainty and deter usage.</p>
<p>Even if most major operators cooperated and formed a club with mutually lower prices, it would undermine the arrangement if only a few defectors refused to participate. The minority of defecting operators would be able to both reap exorbitant data rates from other operators’ customers as well as benefit from a larger total market and customers’ expectations of low prices.</p>
<p>For the operator market as a whole, the optimal end-state would be if all  operators chose the strategy of cooperation, but the optimal individual rationality for one operator is to defect from any agreement. The result is that all operators are worse off in a sub-optimal state of mutual defection.</p>
<p>This can be modeled in game theory as an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma. Here is a simplified numerical example with one operator (player A) playing against all the other operators (player B). Both the players can chose between two strategies: Cooperate (charge affordable data roaming fees) or Defect (charge exorbitant data roaming fees). Player A is the interesting active player in this game and Player B should more be viewed as a passive dummy.</p>
<p>If both players cooperate they will each receive a payoff of 10, denoted as (10, 10) for Player A and B respectively (where 10 for Player B is the payoff for each operator in the operator pool). If Player A chooses to defect while B cooperates the payoff will be (20, 9). The defecting player gains significantly and receives a payoff of 20 while Player B loses and only receive 9. If both Player A and B defect, the payoff will be (5, 5) which means that the total payoff to the players is significantly lower. One the other hand, if Player A is the only player that cooperates in an environment where Player B defects, the payoff will be (2, 6), and A only receives 2 (instead of 5). The figure below shows the game matrix described in normal form.</p>
<table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="4">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" rowspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="2" align="center">Player B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th width="25%" scope="col">Cooperate</th>
<th width="25%" scope="col">Defect</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2" align="center"><span style="color: #aa0000;">Player A</span></td>
<th align="center" scope="row">Cooperate</th>
<td align="center"><span style="color: #aa0000;">10</span>, 10</td>
<td align="center"><span style="color: #aa0000;">2</span>, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th align="center" scope="row">Defect</th>
<td align="center"><span style="color: #aa0000;">20</span>, 9</td>
<td align="center"><span style="color: #aa0000;">5</span>, 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>The payoff matrix shows the strategy of one operator (A) versus all other operators in the end states where either all chose to cooperate or all chose to defect. It is also possible to model the payoffs when the number of cooperating telcos moves from 0 –&gt; 100 percent (described <a href="http://www.mathpsyc.uni-bonn.de/doc/micko/4b.htm">here</a>). Regardless of the share of operators that chose to cooperate vs. defect the conclusion for Player A is the same. The dominant strategy for Player A is to defect, which makes it a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma for the active player. For Player B (all the other players) this is not a Prisoner’s Dilemma as the dominant strategy is to cooperate even if one Player (A) decides to defect. The problem is that for each individual operator it is a dominant strategy to defect even though the common good would be maximized if everybody cooperated.</p>
<hr width=10% align=center>
<p>I don’t have a clear answer for how to escape from this sub-optimal state. A few years ago, European voice roaming showed a similar pattern until the EU Commission mandated a price cap and forced down the prices. If the industry can’t solve this themselves the politicians may intervene again, at least in Europe.</p>
<p>The industry might be able to handle this on its own if the major operators form a club and then exert strong peer pressure on the remaining operators. One way is to punish defecting operators with very unfavorable roaming deals or refuse roaming. However, that will leave the club’s customers with inferior network coverage. It could possibly also be considered anticompetitive if a cartel of market dominants bullied smaller operators.</p>
<p>To be effective and protect the customers from accidentally connecting to a network with exorbitant prices, an operator club probably needs to have a technical software solution installed on their customers’ handsets. This software would ensure that the handset only connects automatically to networks that are members of the club, even if a renegade network has a higher signal strength. This should be manageable for operator branded handsets but if customers just have SIM cards it will be complicated to mandate that  they install an app that can control low-level functionality on almost any device.</p>
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		<title>The Blackberry Playbook will be a gaming platform – the writing is on the tablet</title>
		<link>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/05/blackberry-playbook-will-be-a-gaming-platform/</link>
		<comments>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/05/blackberry-playbook-will-be-a-gaming-platform/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 07 May 2011 13:31:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jonas Lind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobile Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Products and Gadgets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blackberry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cross-platform]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Playbook]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[QNX]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tablet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TAT]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mobileforesight.com/?p=1421</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p class="wp-caption-text">Blackberry Playbook</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">An abbreviated version of this article has previously been
published on the Technorati Technology Channel.</p>
<p>Now that the Blackberry Playbook has been released it is fairly obvious that RIM is putting the building blocks in place for a future positioning of the Playbook as a gaming platform, most likely in their next model. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_1429" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 560px"><a href="http://www.mobileforesight.com/sv/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Playbook-550pix.jpg"><img src="http://www.mobileforesight.com/sv/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Playbook-550pix.jpg" alt="" title="Blackberry Playbook" width="550" height="327" class="size-full wp-image-1429" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">Blackberry Playbook</p></div>
<p style="text-align: center;"><em>An abbreviated version of this article has previously been<br />
published on the <a href="http://technorati.com/technology/article/the-blackberry-playbook-will-be-a/">Technorati Technology Channel</a>.</em></p>
<p>Now that the Blackberry Playbook has been released it is fairly obvious that RIM is putting the building blocks in place for a future positioning of the Playbook as a gaming platform, most likely in their next model. After sifting through the last few <a href="http://voices.allthingsd.com/20110418/rims-blackberry-playbook-tablet-stands-a-chance%E2%80%A6in-2012/?mod=ATD_rss">week’s</a> <a href="http://blogs.strategyanalytics.com/WMS/post/2011/04/19/Thoughts-on-the-Playbook.aspx">industry</a> <a href="http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2383699,00.asp">chatter</a> and reviews of the Playbook it seems that this connection has gone unnoticed.</p>
<p>The Playbook tablet received rather mixed reviews when it was released on April 19. Most reviewers liked the fast dual-core processor, the sleek design, the excellent stereo sound, and the crisp HD video. However, the reviewers were dissatisfied with the buggy software and the lack of available apps. Another thing they disliked was the need to connect with a Blackberry phone for native email, calendar etc. The most extensive reviews can be found <a href="http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2383410,00.asp">here</a>, <a href="http://www.slashgear.com/blackberry-playbook-review-19146913/">here</a>, <a href="http://www.laptopmag.com/review/tablets/blackberry-playbook.aspx">here</a>, and <a href="http://technologizer.com/2011/04/14/blackberry-playbook-reviews/">here</a>. The impression of the Playbook is of an unfinished product that was rushed to market, though RIM promises upcoming free software upgrades.</p>
<p>Fair enough. But RIM is clearly positioning the Playbook for the <a href="http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2011/04/17/rim-chiefs-defend-playbook-comes-market.htm">enterprise market</a> in this first iteration. The Playbook only has WiFi connectivity and to access the mobile networks or access your email app you need to establish a Bluetooth bridge with your Blackberry smartphone. This might seem like a clumsy solution but is actually a “CIO-friendly” move. Most corporate users in the target market already own a Blackberry smartphone. The corporate email will still reside inside the smartphone, with its very high security. If the connection is lost, no sensitive information remains on the Playbook. This would enable RIM to avoid the complexity of making the Playbook as secure a platform as the traditional Blackberry handsets right now. From a marketing perspective, it is also the right tactical move for RIM to get the tablet accepted as a dull product in the enterprise market before embarking on a gaming strategy.</p>
<p>There are a number of indications that the Playbook is designed to be a gaming platform. The new operating system QNX that RIM bought last year is a fast and very stable real-time OS. In embedded systems where stability is absolutely critical such as in cars, satellites, the military, medtech, and industrial equipment QNX is an established market leader. QNX will easily compete with Android, iOS, and WP7 in terms of raw performance. And at the Blackberry <a href="http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/09/blackberry-playbook-tablet/">developer conference</a> last fall, the QNX founder Dan Dodge said: “The Playbook will be an incredible gaming platform for game designers”. One of RIM&#8217;s top exceutives called it a &#8220;<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/blackberry/8454152/Will-BlackBerry-and-the-Playbook-crumble-under-pressure-from-Google-and-Apple.html">party machine</a>&#8220;.</p>
<p>The design choice by RIM to equip the Playbook with high quality sound, HD-video, and a fast dual core processor also fits with this strategy. Another strong sign of RIM’s commitment is the recently announced <a href="http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/RIM-Expands-Application-Ecosystem-for-BlackBerry-PlayBook-NASDAQ-RIMM-1417363.htm">alliance</a> with the two cross-platform game engine firms Ideaworks and Unity. Support for QNX is currently being developed. This will make it easy to quickly port the 100s of gaming apps using Ideaworks SDK to enter the Playbook ecosystem.</p>
<p>Once Ideaworks has added QNX to their C++ cross-platform tool (Airplay SDK), I expect intense activity behind the scenes followed by a splash launch of 100s of fast games running native code on the Playbook when RIM releases the next model of the tablet. And I don’t think it is a coincidence that RIM chose the name Playbook.</p>
<hr width=10% align=center>
<p>For some time, <a href="http://www.slate.com/id/2291255/">bashing</a> RIM and Blackberry has been popular among industry pundits. Their sagging market share is viewed as proof that it’s only a matter of time before Blackberry will be a dead platform. But don’t underestimate RIM.</p>
<p>With QNX and the recently acquired Swedish UI framework from TAT they are assembling an excellent technical platform. All they need now is a way to migrate apps into their ecosystem. Obviously, attracting apps is a top priority for RIM and they have chosen to use as many paths as possible to enter their new platform. QNX on Playbook supports Flash, AIR, and sandbox app players for Blackberry Java plus Android 2.3 apps. It also supports the cross-platform tools WebWorks (for HTML5/JavaScript), Airplay SDK and Unity 3 (for C++ games), and native SDK (for C++). Expect future Blackberry phones with QNX to be equipped in a similar way.</p>
<p>Another of RIM’s strengths is a strong foothold in two attractive market segments: corporate users and the 16-25 youth market, though RIM is not present in all geographical markets.</p>
<p>RIM’s stronghold in the corporate market is based on their seamless integration of secure email while the youth market is driven by network effects from the instant messaging app BBM (Blackberry Messenger). In markets such as the UK and Indonesia where the BBM has reached a critical mass it has become a must have in the youth market segment. BBM has even superseded the popularity of SMS in this market segment. You need a Blackberry to be part of the BBM messaging network.</p>
<p>Making gaming apps a high priority is a logical move for RIM, enabling them to attract the needed critical mass in the youth market segments in countries where Blackberry’s position is currently weak. It might even be the case that the smaller form factor of the Playbook (lower weight; 7 inch screen vs. 10 for the competitors) is a way of making it easier for teens to carry it around. Even though the gaming platform strategy is viable on its own it might just be a means to promote the real killer app for Blackberry – BBM.</p>
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		<title>The HTML5 hype – time for a reality check</title>
		<link>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/03/html5-hype-time-for-a-reality-check/</link>
		<comments>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/03/html5-hype-time-for-a-reality-check/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Mar 2011 09:32:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jonas Lind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobile Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[apps]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fragmentation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HTML5]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[smartphone]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mobileforesight.com/?p=1396</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>The hype created by the promise of HTML5 has almost reached fever pitch during the last quarter. With HTML5/CSS3 it will be possible to run most types of applications directly in the “browser” and the need to install apps that execute native code will be a thing of the past. HTML5 can run from a [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="http://venturebeat.com/2010/11/08/the-iphone-app-is-the-flash-homepage-of-2010/">hype</a> created by the promise of HTML5 has almost reached fever pitch during the last quarter. With HTML5/CSS3 it will be possible to run most types of applications directly in the “browser” and the need to install apps that execute native code will be a thing of the past. HTML5 can run from a cache in your smartphone/tablet/PC even if you are offline and the app can access the phone’s GPS, compass, accelerometer, touch recognition and native video/audio control. App developers will no longer need to develop separate native versions for iPhone, Android, WP, Blackberry, Samsung/Bada, and WebOS. Just write once in HTML5 and run everywhere.</p>
<p>There is truth in all this and HTML5 is a great technology. But as usual during the peak of inflated expectations people tend to forget the limitations. <a href="http://techcrunch.com/2011/02/09/html5-versus-native-apps/">HTML5 is still an immature technology</a>. The final draft will be finished in mid-2011 and the W3C recently stated that the formal standard decision will be delayed until <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/14/html5_in_2014/">2014</a>. When people actually start using HTML5 the experience will most likely be underwhelming as developers are faced with the limitations of the technology. (This view is supported by <a href="http://gigaom.com/2010/09/30/mobilize-2010-native-mobile-apps-will-be-with-us-for-some-time/">comments</a> from <a href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/mobile/2010/11/weekly-poll-html5-vs-native-ap.php">industry</a> <a href="http://blog.davidpadbury.com/2010/11/22/html5-live-conference/">conferences</a>.)  Older handsets will most likely not be able to run full HTML5 web apps, which kind of defeats the vision of universal access, at least for the near future.</p>
<p>Native apps will always offer better performance, <a href="http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/08/ff_webrip/all/1">better UI/UX</a>, and better integration with the device hardware. For example, HTML5 does not support augmented reality. HTML5 will, over time, be able to close the gap but if we assume that the native app platforms continue to develop, the goalpost will be moving as well. Ecosystem owners (Apple, Google, etc.) will of course work to make their native development environment as pleasant as possible to work with. In addition, cross-platform tools in the native environment will reduce the effort of porting from one platform to the other.</p>
<p>What the market tends to forget is that the fundamental trade-off between standardization and flexibility will not go away. By complying with the HTML5 standard, handset makers and web app developers will be unable to differentiate outside the limits set by the standard. It is inevitable that one global standard will not be fully capable of adapting to a highly heterogeneous base of various screen sizes, handsets, tablets, etc. Once a committee-based standard is finalized, innovations and new product features that are introduced after that point will not be included until the next upgrade of the standard. Apps will be better at taking full advantage of device variation and new functionality.</p>
<p>I doubt vendors will be able to resist the siren song of differentiation. When they give in to this temptation, the evil twin of differentiation – fragmentation – will rear its ugly head. This fragmentation will either undermine HTML5 as a universal standard (which will make it less attractive in the same way as Java ME), or be expressed in the form of more native apps.</p>
<p>Another fundamental trade-off in software is between raw performance and developer convenience. Coding in high level languages is easier for less experienced developers and the pool of HTML/JavaScript developers is much larger than the number of experienced C++ developers. It will be cheaper and easier to develop in HTML5 but performance will have to be sacrificed. For less advanced applications this might be a good trade-off but it is a trade-off nonetheless. Efficient low level coding also translates into lower battery drainage, which is important for smartphones.</p>
<p>In many cases it will be better to have a HTML5 web app than no app at all. But if high performance is critical, native apps will be the obvious choice. Performance is not just relevant in obvious areas such as games. If users expect touch-based smartphone apps that don’t freeze when browsing or scrolling it might be a critical competitive differentiator for all apps.</p>
<p>As pointed out by Forrester, this entire &#8220;either/or&#8221; scenario with HTML5 vs. apps is driven by <a href="http://www.infoworld.com/d/developer-world/analyst-html5-far-killing-web-plug-ins-603">vendor politics</a>. Although I think that another strong driver is the large community of web developers who find C programming too hard. These web developers will gladly embrace HTML5 as a way to enter the mobile marketspace.</p>
<p>HTML5 is pushed by Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Apple. Continued browser dominance is critical for Google’s ad business. Microsoft and Apple want to kill Flash. Facebook wants universal access. But actions speak louder than words; Google is actively recruiting app developers and <a href="http://techcrunch.com/2011/02/08/google-translate-app/">releasing more of their own services as apps</a>. For example, Google Voice, Google Places, and now also Google Translate. (Google Earth is the most widely known example despite it having been around for years.) Today large players that quickly want to reach the market with their services are developing native apps when the functionality demands it, in spite of the pro-HTML5 rhetoric.</p>
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		<title>The Nokia Microsoft marriage: what was Elop thinking?</title>
		<link>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/02/nokia-microsoft-marriage-what-was-elop-thinking/</link>
		<comments>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/02/nokia-microsoft-marriage-what-was-elop-thinking/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Feb 2011 10:39:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jonas Lind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobile Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[microsoft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nokia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[smartphone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stephen Elop]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Symbian]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Windows Phone]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mobileforesight.com/?p=1365</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>A week after the Nokia press conference last Friday, the industry still seems to be very conflicted about its view of the alliance. After reading most of the industry comments, I still can’t wrap my head around all the implications and come to a clear-cut conclusion. The pessimists view it as a disaster that will [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A week after the Nokia press conference <a href="http://mobilized.allthingsd.com/20110211/live-from-nokias-investor-meeting-does-the-new-strategy-add-up/">last Friday</a>, the industry still seems to be very <a href="http://gigaom.com/2011/02/11/what-the-web-is-saying-nokia-partners-with-microsoft/">conflicted</a> about its view of the alliance. After reading most of the industry comments, I still can’t wrap my head around all the implications and come to a clear-cut conclusion. The <a href="http://communities-dominate.blogs.com/brands/2011/02/when-things-get-even-worse-than-you-thought-1st-preview-of-potential-for-nokia-microsoft-partnership.html">pessimists</a> <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/252851-microsoft-and-nokia-together-they-could-make-the-worst-phone-ever">view</a> it as a <a href="http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=2931">disaster</a> that will <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-nokia-is-still-doomed-2011-2">destroy</a> Nokia and as a huge win for Microsoft/Windows Phone. The <a href="http://www.mobilecrunch.com/2011/02/11/nokias-road-ahead-will-be-rough-but-not-impassible/">slightly</a> <a href="http://www.brightsideofnews.com/news/2011/2/15/infographic-shows-why-nokia-microsoft-partnership-makes-sense.aspx">more</a> <a href="http://mobileopportunity.blogspot.com/2011/02/impact-of-nokia-microsoft-alliance.html">optimistic</a> <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/17/bar_room_chat/">view</a> is that the alliance was the best Nokia could do, given their <a href="http://venturebeat.com/2011/02/14/nokia-microsoft/">weak</a> position and downward spiral.</p>
<p>Nokia said they rejected using Android to avoid being commoditized and dependent on Google. With the MS alliance Nokia stated that the smartphone market would be a three-horse race between MS/Nokia, Apple, and Android (conveniently forgetting RIM, Bada, and HP/WebOS). Nokia probably has a point. If Nokia had chosen Android as their smartphone OS, Android’s dominance would be inevitable, Google would emerge as the new evil empire, and the handset makers would wind up in a undifferentiated cut-throat competition with each other. Remember, Android is only open source for the developers. For the handset makers, it is a <a href="http://www.visionmobile.com/blog/2010/04/is-android-evil/">benign tyranny</a> under Google. On the other hand, Android (and RIM) are ready to ship today if Nokia had chosen either of them as a partner. Windows Phone 7 is not yet fully developed and Nokia will <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/feb/16/nokia-windows-phone-microsoft-delay?CMP=twt_gu">wait</a> for the next release (codenamed Mango), planned for October before shipping new models.</p>
<p>What I find incomprehensible is how Nokia could publicly kill Symbian before they have new WP based models to offer the market. Sales of the legacy Symbian smartphones will most likely nosedive during the transition time. If Nokia had been more shrewd, they could have made a limited public statement now about adapting WP for smartphones in the US while maintaining their commitment to upgrading Symbian, but with a lower development budget. The extent of the full alliance with Microsoft could have been kept secret until October when Nokia will “suddenly decide” to give up on Symbian as a smartphone platform and sign an extensive alliance with Microsoft.</p>
<p>However, there are a few slivers of hope for Nokia during this transition time. One lifeline is that some Nokia customers will buy a Symbian smartphone for the camera, UI, maps, email or other factors that are unrelated to the size of the app ecosystem. Another is that the powerful operators have a political interest in the success of the MS/Nokia alliance. If they can keep another ecosystem alive the bargaining power of Apple and Google/Android will be reduced. By subsidizing a few Symbian smartphones they can help to keep Nokia afloat. (This is most likely wishful thinking, from the chatter at MWC it seems that carriers are about to abandon Symbian handsets.) A third market segment is large corporate buyers with integrated backend systems based on Symbian. They are locked in and forced to continue buying Symbian smartphones until they have managed to integrate on another platform, most likely RIM or Android.</p>
<p>The massive criticism against Nokia’s strategy will be hard to overcome. It is exacerbated by <a href="http://scobleizer.com/2011/02/11/dear-nokia-fans-youre-nuts/">emotional reactions</a> and anti-Microsoft sentiments among developers and Nokia old-timers. If MS/Nokia can’t entice developers to join, the entire alliance will be a failure.</p>
<hr width=10% align=center>
<p>It is well-known that Symbian is a horrible platform for developers but I have hardly seen any comments about the developer environment in <a href="http://www.visionmobile.com/blog/2010/09/windows-phone-7-tipping-the-scales-of-the-smartphone-market/">Windows Phone</a>. Microsoft understands the importance of an attractive development environment. Developer oriented products such as Visual Studio, .Net, and C# show that they can actually get it right. The developer environment for WP will be Silverlight and XNA from Microsoft.</p>
<p>The only analysis of the WP development environment I have found is from a survey last summer by <a href="http://www.visionmobile.com/blog/2010/07/developer-economics-2010-the-role-of-networks-in-a-developer-world/">Vision Mobile</a>. In that survey developers rated early versions of WP as rather complicated to work with. The average time for developers to master WP was 9 months, which is significantly longer compared to Android (5 months) or iPhone (around 7 months). It was also considered problematic to create great UI:s with the early version of WP7 from mid 2010. However, developers gave the IDE with the emulator/debugger in WP7 a high rating. This made it possible to code and prototype quite quickly.</p>
<p>If it is correct that WP7 is a completely rewritten OS, there is a chance that Microsoft has managed to dump their clumsy legacy from Windows CE and Windows Mobile. These outdated bloatware platforms were attempts to run full Windows programs on the mobile, which resulted in inferior performance, execution speed, and battery life. If Microsoft has learned their lesson, fine. But I am not convinced that Microsoft&#8217;s culture can execute and deliver efficient and lean code.</p>
<p>All in all, I think the announced strategy will be detrimental for Nokia. Nokia has killed Symbian and there is no going back. However, we can still speculate about Nokia’s alternative strategies. Nokia did actually have a viable transition strategy for Symbian. It was based on pushing Symbian down in the stack to hide it from ordinary developers. Nokia wanted to promote the application framework Qt (“cute”) as the development environment that hides <a href="http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/10/symbian-fixed/all/1">Symbian</a>. The cross-platform capabilities in Qt would make it seamless to migrate these apps to MeeGo at a later stage. Considering how clumsily Nokia executed their new strategy I think they would probably have been better off sticking to their old transition strategy.</p>
<p>If Nokia can survive 2011 and they manage to introduce attractive models based on WP in 2012 they still have a chance of a revival. But there are many ifs. Will the WP experience be compelling enough for developers and consumers? Will Nokia be able to manage development projects in an alliance with another organization? Can Nokia leverage their internal capabilities or will the bloated internal <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/16/nokia_had_choices_but_couldnt_take_them/">bureaucracy</a> slow down product development? Is Microsoft prepared to cooperate with good will intentions or do they have the same hidden agenda as in the 1990s and to enter strategic partnerships with <a href="http://www.asymco.com/2011/02/11/in-memoriam-microsofts-previous-strategic-mobile-partners/">bad faith</a>? Can Microsoft unlearn their ingrained habits?</p>
<p>Even if the MS/Nokia handsets are somewhat uncompetitive on arrival, the operators might step in and save the venture with handset subsidies. Their agenda is to weaken Apple and Google/Android.</p>
<hr width=10% align=center>
<p>On the surface Nokia’s strategic move seems to be the equivalent of shooting themselves in the foot. However, Nokia’s top management and Elop are not idiots. There has to be some rationale that makes this move logical. At least from their point of view.</p>
<p>Perhaps the answer can be found in an extensive feature article in the business section of the Finnish newspaper <a href="http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Knock+Knock+Nokias+Heavy+Fall/1135260596609">Helsingin Sanomat</a> from October 2010 (<a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/10/14/nokia_dilbert/">summary here</a>). The article is a damning account of how Nokia lost its way after 2004 when an internal re-organization transformed the agile product-focused company into a matrix organization with three divisions; Mobile Phones, Multimedia, and Enterprise Solutions. The divisions were encouraged to compete internally for staff and resources. This led to endless internal politics, infighting, and bureaucracy. 300 vice presidents, fighting with each other, ensured that innovation was stifled. The results were that Nokia was unable to exploit innovation and their strong internal capabilities. A number of foolish product design decisions followed. Starting in 2001, Nokia had developed their Series 90, a touch screen UI which should have been the basis for Nokia&#8217;s iPhone competitors today. But it was cancelled in 2005. In later attempt to emulate iPhone they copied the worst from the iPhone. For example, Nokia phones that do not allow one to replace the battery, models with the micro-SD card reader removed, high end Nokia phones without MMS because some Nokia product manager thought it was “an outdated technology”. The enterprise E series phones could not use the best imaging features because the consumer multimedia division owned the technology and refused access. At the same time, the N series models were denied MailForExchange, and SIP functionality in the same way. The work with Symbian, QT and MeeGo dragged on forever without visible results.</p>
<p>Once a large organization is bogged down by bureaucracy it is very difficult to unravel. Perhaps Elop came to the conclusion that internal reorganization would be risky and too time consuming. The teams working on Symbian, QT and MeeGo had under-delivered for years and Nokia’s senior management had no way of knowing if the under-performance was due to bureaucracy – or if they just were not up to the job. Elop had the choice of betting the future of the company on the internal software teams, or on Microsoft. His bet on Microsoft is a signal of his mistrust of Nokia’s capabilities in software today. (Maybe a new CEO with a strong background in software development would have come to another conclusion. But we will never know the answer to that question.)</p>
<p>I hope Elop’s next project will be to turn the internal organization on its head to unleash the excellent engineering competence and what is left of the aggressive, agile firm from the 1990s.</p>
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		<title>Ahonen: “This is the golden age of mobile”</title>
		<link>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/02/review-tomi-ahonen-book/</link>
		<comments>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2011/02/review-tomi-ahonen-book/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Feb 2011 09:25:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jonas Lind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobile Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trends and Futurism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[golden age of mobile]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SMS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tomi Ahonen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trillion dollar industry]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mobileforesight.com/?p=1319</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>The mobile guru and former Nokia executive Tomi Ahonen has released his new book &#8216;The Insider&#8217;s Guide to Mobile&#8216; as a free ebook for download. It is an excellent overview of the mobile industry and mobile market opportunity. Its tech evangelism style can be slightly annoying but he presents rather compelling arguments to back up [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The mobile guru and former Nokia executive Tomi Ahonen has released his new book &#8216;<a href="http://www.lulu.com/product/ebook/insiders-guide-to-mobile-free-edition/14591083">The Insider&#8217;s Guide to Mobile</a>&#8216; as a free ebook for download. It is an excellent overview of the mobile industry and mobile market opportunity. Its tech evangelism style can be slightly annoying but he presents rather compelling arguments to back up his claims. For example, that there are 3.7 billion unique users of mobile, almost twice the number of Internet users (1.8 billion). With strong growth and a total market size of 1.1 trillion dollars, the mobile industry is one of the most attractive industries on the planet. Ahonen has identified 13 other industries worth 5 trillion dollars that will be disrupted by mobile in a tidal wave convergence during the next decade. Here is a quote which provides a good summary of the book:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;"><strong><em>“This is the golden age of mobile. It is the best economic opportunity of our lifetimes.”</em></strong></p>
<p>Ahonen provides an important counterweight to the Net-centric evangelists from the US West Coast who don’t understand telecom and dismiss it as a dinosaur industry. For example, just the revenues from SMS at 100 billion dollars is almost as much as the combined size of the music industry (20 BUSD), Hollywood movies (25 BUSD), video gaming including consoles (40 BUSD), and all paid content on the Net (27 BUSD). MMS (which has been called a failure) has already grown to 31 billion dollars and is larger than the entire music industry.</p>
<p>While most web-centric players struggle for more income with meager advertising as their main revenue source, mobile service providers get paid by the users and rarely have the same problem. One example is Real Madrid’s fan club. They charge 12 Euros/month for their mobile service and have 100,000 paying users. Another example is the three major mobile social networks in Japan (Mixi, Mobage Town, Gree). They have revenues of around 250 – 350 million dollars each. Even though these Japanese services can be accessed via the web, 76 percent of the users only use their mobile to reach the service. Advertising is a minor part of revenues. Virtual goods and virtual currencies are far more important.</p>
<p>Ahonen’s main message is that “mobile internet” is not the same as the PC-based web through a phone. Mobile services are something different. They take advantage of the unique features of mobile that can’t be replicated on the PC-based web. On the mobile handset identification, messaging, and a payment system are already built-in. The handset is always with you and interaction is much faster. The mobile can be used with one hand, which is impossible with a 3G enabled laptop or netbook. Another example is picture sharing via MMS, which is much more seamless and easier than connecting your camera to the PC and uploading it. Several mobile services are impractical or almost impossible to replicate on the PC-based internet. For example, if you scan a bar code in a store with your  camera phone and get a list of alternative vendors for the product you are interested in.</p>
<p>Even though advanced sexy apps on smartphones are impressive, Ahonen points out that only 13 percent of the mobile population has a smartphone. The big numbers and huge potential is in the “boring” SMS and MMS services. The average global SMS user sends 100 SMS/month. Voice traffic is falling from cannibalization by SMS and 13% of mobile users have stopped placing outgoing voice calls entirely. MMS is already used by 1.7 billion users. His advice is that if your company is in an industry where you need to reach the mass market (banks, retailers, airlines, etc.) today the first step should be to develop SMS-based services. After that go for MMS, Wap, xTML (“phone browsers”), downloadable Flash/Java/Brew, and smartphone apps – in that order.</p>
<p>Another area where Ahonen’s arguments go against industry consensus is in his disbelief in Location Based Services. His point is that most users are seldom lost – and if they are abroad the punitive roaming charges deters usage. Users are also very reluctant to allow others to track their position. A few years ago Disney launched a “family friendly” MVNO where parents could locate their children with a child-tracker. The Disney phone instantly became toxic among kids and teenagers and the phones were conveniently forgotten at home, deceiving parents into believing that the kids were home doing homework. Disney shut down the service in 2007.</p>
<p>I find his perspective refreshing, in particular when he extols services that are considered “uncool” by the Netheads in Silicon Valley. It is an easy and almost entertaining read, I highly recommend this book.</p>
<p>Tomi Ahonen&#8217;s blogg: <a href="http://www.communities-dominate.blogs.com/">Communites Dominate  Brands</a></p>
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		<title>The end of the Palm saga</title>
		<link>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2010/03/the-end-of-the-palm-saga/</link>
		<comments>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2010/03/the-end-of-the-palm-saga/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 31 Mar 2010 14:14:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jonas Lind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobile Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palm]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pda]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mobileforesight.com/?p=1238</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>The company that managed to develop the first successful PDA in 1996, the Palm Pilot, is losing out in the battle for the smartphone market.</p>
<p>Palm didn’t have the resources to quickly match the iPhone, RIM, and Android. Palm’s own smartphone, the Pre, was late to market when it launched in June last year. The industry [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The company that managed to develop the first successful PDA in 1996, the Palm Pilot, is losing out in the battle for the smartphone market.</p>
<p>Palm didn’t have the resources to quickly match the iPhone, RIM, and Android. Palm’s own smartphone, the Pre, was late to market when it launched in June last year. The industry chatter before the launch viewed the Pre as Palm’s last chance to survive and a do or die project.</p>
<p>Now the results are in. Sales of the Pre have been a disappointment. During Q3 2009 they only <a href="http://www.rethink-wireless.com/article.asp?article_id=2796">sold</a> 408,000 units to customers, a drop of 29% from the second quarter. Their global market share in Q309 was 1% and Palm only has a significant presence on the North American market with a 5% market share. The Palm app store only has 525 applications.</p>
<p>The smartphone market already has too many <a href="http://jkontherun.com/2010/02/16/the-changing-smartphone-landscape/">incompatible</a> software platforms: iPhone, Blackberry, Symbian, Windows Mobile, BREW, Bada and LiMo. The <a href="http://blogs.strategyanalytics.com/stp/?p=30">weakest players</a> will not be able to build an ecosystem of developers and I think the network effects will be ruthless once the market has decided that a platform is a loser. The WebOS from Palm is just one too many.</p>
<p>Palm might have a slim chance if they abandon WebOS in favor of Android, but that means even more lost time. Perhaps a strong industrial buyer will acquire Palm but most of the players have already placed their bets on Android or one of the other platforms.</p>
<p>Palm Computing defined the PDA market in the <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Piloting-Palm-Handspring-Handheld-Industry/dp/0471089656/ref=tmm_hrd_title_0">1990s</a> and in 1998 they held a 59% market share. In 2005, they brought a well designed PDA-phone (Treo 650) to the market. However, at that time the mobile data networks were too expensive and lacked seamless roaming. There were no app stores. The high end smartphones of 2005 were an expensive niche product with little appeal to the mainstream market. It is a sad story that this company now seems to be heading for the grave. But if there are winners on the market there have to be losers.</p>
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		<title>The Google Phone coming out in January?</title>
		<link>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2009/12/google-phone-coming-out-in-january/</link>
		<comments>http://www.mobileforesight.com/2009/12/google-phone-coming-out-in-january/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Dec 2009 10:29:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jonas Lind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mobile Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Products and Gadgets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[google phone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nexus one]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mobileforesight.com/?p=1145</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Google has the Midas touch and never fails – right? What if they made a Google Phone (gPhone?) and disrupted the global phone market? They already have a smartphone OS and aggressive plans for the market.</p>
<p>Rumors about a Google Phone have been floating around for some time but gained momentum yesterday with tweets claiming that [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Google has the Midas touch and never fails – right? What if they made a Google Phone (gPhone?) and disrupted the global phone market? They already have a smartphone OS and aggressive plans for the market.</p>
<p>Rumors about a Google Phone have been floating around for some time but gained momentum yesterday with tweets claiming that Google employees had been given a test series of a HTC phone equipped with Android 2.1. Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt will give a keynote speech at the Mobile World Congress in 2010. Connect the dots? Yes, today Google <a href="http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/12/google-phone-unlocked-confirmed/">confirmed</a>.</p>
<p>Google launching their own smartphone is a significant move for this pure play internet and software company. However, I doubt that Google will be a serious threat to the major players in the market. Apple is already too entrenched as the smartphone market leader. Android is still immature compared to the iPhone OS. Nokia is unbeatable in the mass market of less advanced models. The major operators are wary about Google’s growing ambitions and will most likely be less than cooperative. Google might be best positioned to work with second tier and disruptive players such as 3. To sum up, a gphone is notable news but will most likely not overturn the industry – at least not in 2010.</p>
<p>Update: The phone will be called Nexus One and here is a <a href="http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/12/nexus-one-google-phone-picture/">picture</a> (it looks exactly like a HTC Passion).</p>
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